could expect the official to rely more heavily on the ascribed authority of his office and on the symbols and the power accompanying it to get his job done. 4 These are some of the dimensions in which we expected to find changes in the official-client relationship as a result both of the large and rapid increase of clients and of the tensions arising from the radical cultural differences between officials and clients. We found such examples, of course, but we also found many examples of change in exactly the opposite direction. Rather than a marked increase in the degree of bureaucratization in officialclient relations, we found evidence of debureaucratization. We often found officials relating to clients personally, taking sympathetic account of the status "new immigrant", and not confining themselves to their officially relevant roles. And frequently we found officials trying to get their job done, not so much by means of the power and symbols of office, but on the basis of exchange of services, or persuasion, or personal charisma.
In the pages that follow, we shall try to explain how such relationships appear to arise. But it is important to bear in mind that these are, so far, only impressionistic observations. The pilot study and, ultimately, the full-scale research, we hope, will be better founded.
THEORY AND RESEARCH ON BUREAUCRATIZATION
In the broadest sense, the theoretical problem here deals with the conditions affecting the degree of bureaucratization of an organization, specifically of the bureaucrat-client relationship. We are interested in the factors that make for varying degrees of bureaucratization as well as the factors (presumably the same ones) that influence the direction of organizational change. Indeed, in the writings of Max Weber and Robert Michels the problem of organizational change is essentially identical with the theme of bureaucratization.5 If the classical sociological writings were con4Here and elsewhere we make use of Parsons' terminology. Although we make an effort to communicate the meaning of the several concepts we employ, for a full discussion see Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, 1951), ch. ii. 5Max Weber, "The Presuppositions and Causes of Bureaucracy," in Robert K. Merton, Ailsa P. Gray, Barbara Hockey, and Hanan Selvin, eds., Reader in 116 ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY cerned with bureaucratization, the later writings have devoted themselves to the problems of overbureaucratization. Thus, discussions of deviations from the ideal-type bureaucracy outlined by Weber focused on overbureaucratization as a threat to the attainment of the very goals for which the organizations were established. The leading character in these discussions, the official who converts means into ends, has been frequently described both in literary and scientific publications. The same is true for the accompanying manifestations of exaggerated hierarchy and red tape.,
Recently, however, with the beginning of empirical research on organizational behavior, these assumptions about the unidirectional evolution of organizations have been put into broader perspective. Thus, recent empirical research seems to suggest that (1) the trend toward total bureaucratization of organizations may sometimes be averted;7 (2) actual bureaucracies are compounded of nonbureaucratic elements also;8 (3) bureaucracies, once established, are by no means unchanging;9 and (4) when changes do Bureaucracy (Glencoe, 1952), 60-68. Of course, Weber was also concerned with the role of internal factors making for a greater degree of bureaucratization in the organization, a notable example being his discussion of "The Routinization of Charisma," which tends to develop when a group faces the problem of leadership succession, ibid., pp. 92-100. This also gives a brief statement of Robert Michels' argument (pp. 88-92), as does his Political Parties (Glencoe, 1949).
"The best known of these essays is probably Robert K. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," in Merton et al., op. cit., pp. 361-371. 7Seymour M. Lipset, Martin A. Trow and James S. Coleman, Union Democracy (Glencoe, 1956), try to specify the conditions that contribute, in at least one case, to the maintenance of trade-union democracy rather than oligarchic bureaucracy. 8This, of course, refers to the dominant trend of present-day research, which has been concerned with the existence and the functions of informal social relations in the context of formal organization. But more important for our present purpose is the incipient concern for informal aspects of relationships between bureaucrats and the public. 
Factors Affecting Bureaucratization in the Official-Client Relationship
The literature provides a number of suggestions concerning the factors affecting bureaucratization in general. Weber's emphasis has already been noted.11 Succession is another familiar example. When a new director takes over from a predecessor, he has little choice but to insist on relatively greater formal relations, to demand adherence to the appointed channels of communication, and the like.12 Another factor is monopolization. When an organization has a monopoly on certain goods or services (as most public bureaucracies have, of course), there is little chance of effective protest on the part of the client and no possibility of recourse to a competitor; under such conditions, bureaucrats may permit themselves an attitude of detachment and ritualistic formalism vis-?-vis their clients.13
The reverse of each of these influences should be associated with a lesser degree of bureaucratization. Thus, a smaller organization or one which suffers a reduction in size ought to be less bureaucratic. So should an organization that is aware that its clients have a choice between it and a competitor.
Each of these factors, of course, has its impact on the officialclient or the superior-subordinate relationships.14 But there are other factors worth singling out for their specific impact on these relationships. It is well known, for example, that soldiers in combat relate to others and to their officers in a much less bureaucratic way than they do behind the front lines or in peacetime. As a final example of debureaucratization, Turner's study of the navy disbursing officer during wartime will serve particularly well.20 Turner indicated several factors that influenced these officers to depart from the orientation prescribed by the rule book to establish more diffuse relations with some of their clients and to show favoritism. First, many clients of the disbursing officer were his superiors in rank and, consequently, his superiors in other role relationships. Secondly, he found it advantageous to help others who could reciprocate, such as the mess officer. This dependence, in part a function of his isolation from other social contacts, was embedded in a more general interdependence created by the war.2' Finally, client and bureaucrat were dependent on each other because, especially during the war, the higher authorities who were to be consulted in case of doubt were both physically and psychologically distant.
This dependence of clients and officials on each other appears as a key factor in the other cases as well, and for much the same 
Role Impingement as a Characterization of Bureaucratization and Debureaucratization
The notion of dependence may be viewed sociologically as a special case of the impingement of other role relationships on a given bureaucratic relationship. In Turner's study, for example, the observed debureaucratization could be considered a product of the regularized contacts in other roles that existed between the disbursing officer and his clients. Moreover, if debureaucratization may be characterized in terms of the impingement of nonbureaucratic roles on bureaucratic ones, then overbureaucratization may be characterized as either the formalistic segregation of a bureaucratic relationship from all other role relations (even relevant ones) or, in its totalitarian form, as the imposition of the bureaucratic relationship on relations outside the scope of the bureaucracy. The bureaucratic ritualist would be an example of one who arbitrarily views all extrabureaucratic roles as irrelevant to the conduct of his office, while the totalitarian bureaucrat "takes his authority home," as, for example, the sergeant bullying his men off duty.
In effect, overbureaucratization and debureaucratization represent a disturbance in the relationship between an organization and its environment that is not envisioned by the classical model of bureaucracy. This model envisages the roles of both bureaucrat and client as segregated to some extent from their other roles; their roles are "specific" to the interaction setting and in this bureaucratic setting it is irrelevant, for example, that both bureau-"Note again that we are using "bureaucrat-client" in a generic sense, implying superordinate-subordinate relations (such as in combat, the mine, the Virginia Company, etc.) as well.
crat and client belong to the same political club. However, even in the ideal-type bureaucracy a role is not completely independent of other roles; some outside roles clearly may be, or must be, considered. If an old man, obviously unable to wait his turn in a long queue, is given special attention by a clerk, this is not a case of an irrelevant role relationship being allowed incorrectly to impinge on the bureaucrat-client relationship. In general, the classic model of bureaucracy requires only that the bureaucratic organization not be directly dependent on external factors for its manpower, its resources, or its motivation for carrying out its organizational task. If an organization relies directly upon any one segment of the population for financing, or for political protection, these sources of support will clearly receive particularistic attention in the dispensation of the organization's services. It is such direct dependence that mechanisms such as boards of trustees, budget bureaus, and the like try to avert by insulating bureaucratic organizations from their sources of support. What is true for the organization as a whole is true for its members as well. If a bureaucrat receives direct rewards from outside the organization in addition to, or instead of, his rewards from within, obviously his independence of action as a bureaucrat is thereby reduced.23
Clearly, then, there is a very delicate balance-varying from organization to organization-between the specific roles defined as relevant to relations within the bureaucracy and those outside roles defined as irrelevant. Note the parallel to our notion of role impingement in Gouldner's concept of "latent identity.P"24 23To cite a familiar example, a civil servant looking to a political party for rewards for his performance in his role as civil servant may do so because he is a political appointee, because he is ideologically committed to his party, or for other reasons.
WAfter developing this analysis of role impingement, we encountered Gouldner's concept and noted its close similarity. "It is necessary to distinguish," says Gouldner, "between those social identities of group members which are consensually regarded as relevant to them in a given setting and those which group members define as being irrelevant, inappropriate to consider, or illegitimate to take into account. The former can be called the manifest social identities, the latter, the latent social identities .... When group members orient themselves to the latent identities of others in their group, they are involved in a relationship with them which is not culturally prescribed by the group norms governing their manifest roles .... It
ISRAELI OFFICIALS AND NEW IMMIGRANTS
Increasingly, in recent years, the contact between immigrants and the new societies to which they have come are mediated by professionals and bureaucrats. The customs agent, the social worker, the policeman, the public health nurse, the housing administrator, -and the like, constitute the immigrants' main connections with the community to which they come, and it is these officials who provide aid and advice, which in earlier migrations were obtained more informally or not at all. This change is characteristic not only of the reception of immigrants in present-day Israel but also of the reception of Puerto Ricans and southern Negroes in New York and Chicago, and of other immigrant groups in the areas receiving them.25 This change is in part a consequence of the greater bureaucratization of these areas in the last generation and in part a consequence of the theory and practice of the welfare state which, adapting itself to the immigrant, proffers many social services unknown to the immigrant of an earlier generation. In Israel, this change is also a consequence of the different pattern of motivation and different demographic composition of present-day would seem clear that latent identities and roles are important because they exert pressure upon the manifest roles, often impairing conformity with their requirements and endemically threatening the equilibrium of the manifest role system." Gouldner goes on to give an example concerning deference to elders in a universalistic setting which is very similar to the one we have presented. See Alvin W. The remainder of this paper is devoted to a preliminary discussion of some of the problems arising out of the contact between immigrants to Israel and the officials with whom they deal, viewed against the theoretical considerations set forth in the first part of this paper. The kind of immigrant with whom we are particularly concerned comes from non-Western countries (such as Yemen, Morocco, Iraq, and so on), where he is likely to have had little or no contact with formal organization.
The question to which we now turn is why so many of the official-client relations observed seemed to be moving in the direction of lesser bureaucratization. We do not mean to imply that Israeli organizations prior to the influx of the non-Western immigrants were close approximations of the Weberian ideal-type; for the small size of the country and the common struggle made for wide networks of interpersonal relations embracing officials and clients alike. The pioneering and egalitarian ideologies frowned on status differentiation, differential distribution of rewards, as well as on formalities of all sorts. Not least important, political parties exerted considerable influence on appointments to and conduct of the public bureaucracies.
As we have already said, the mere increase in organizational size and responsibility might have been expected to result in increased bureaucratization of relations between official and client, between supervisor and worker, and so forth. To this rapid increase in numbers add the divergence of cultural background between the majority of recent immigrants coming from non-Western countries and the European bureaucrats dealing with them, and one would certainly expect an increase in bureaucratic formalism.27
Yet our preliminary observations indicate that this is not the case. We have, of course, found some evidence of increasing bureaucratization as a response to the influx of new immigrants. Thus, in one co-operative organization, for example, the hierarchy became sharply elongated. Previously any member was able to reach the highest official of the organization rather directly and informally, nor was it particularly important whether he brought his problem to one or another of the top officials. Now, the same organization has developed a strict chain of command and a new immigrant with a problem must proceed strictly through the established channels and talk only to the relevant official. Yet, even in this organization, as far as the actual interaction between official and client is concerned, there is evidence of considerable debureaucratization.
Repeatedly, however, we have found in institutions as diverse as health clinics and bus companies, widespread evidence of debureaucratization in the relationship between officials and new immigrants. We have found cases where the official has assigned himself a greater number of tasks vis-a-vis his clients than those assigned him by his organization. We find considerable evidence of the growth of personal relationships between officials and new immigrants. We have even found cases where the official becomes the leader of a kind of "social movement" composed of new immigrants, thus completely reversing the expected trend which is supposed to lead from movements to bureaucracy. A major key to this unanticipated phenomenon is the notion of dependence we have developed, which takes quite a different form at this point. We shall try to describe what we think we have found and, in part, we shall do this in terms of case studies. In one case, officials assumed a teaching role vis-a-vis their clients. In another, officials departed from their prescribed role as agents of socialization in certain patterned ways. In the third case, officials became the leaders of an incipient social movement.
Bureaucrats as Teachers: Dependence on the Client's Performance of His Role
The most characteristic form of debureaucratization in the relationship between bureaucrats and new immigrants in Israel is the assumption by the bureaucrat of the role of teacher along with (or at the expense of) his other functions. Consider, for example, the bus driver who gets out of the bus to teach the idea 124 ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY of a queue-"first come, first served" -an idea which is new to many of his new immigrant passengers. Similarly, the nurse at the well-baby clinic may be seen teaching women, informally, which of their needs are appropriate to the health services and which should be taken to other organizations. Or, the manager of the government-subsidized grocery in the new immigrant settlement may take the initiative and go into homes to teach housewives how to prepare certain foods with which they have had no previous experience.
In all these examples, the bureaucrat takes the time and effort to teach a client something about his (the bureaucrat's) expectations concerning how the client role is to be played. In other words, the bureaucrat teaches the client how to be a client so that he (the bureaucrat) can go on being a bureaucrat. This, it seems to us, is a form of dependence, but one which we have not considered so far; it is dependence on the client to act in a way which makes it possible for the bureaucrat to do his job.
In other words, it is expected by the bureaucrat and the bureaucracy that the client will bring with him to the bureaucratic context certain knowledge of expected roles from "outside," even though he may have had no previous contact with this particular bureaucracy. In Western society, for example, one is prepared for one's first encounter with a customs inspector by virtue of one's singlepurpose relationships with other officials, tradesmen, and the like. When this preparation is lacking, the bureaucrat himself, in the examples cited, added a dimension-teaching-to his relationship with the client. And this change is an example of debureaucratization both because it adds another role to the specifically prescribed one and because the quality of interaction in the teacher-student relationship necessarily impinges on the more formal bureaucratclient relationship. Yet these are the very elements which are officially alien to the ideal-type bureaucracy.28 What is more, as we shall presently see, the teaching relationship may bring further debureaucratization, although conceivably it may simply permit the bureaucrat to perform his role as originally prescribed.
-"This would be particularly true when a bureaucrat's aim is to bring his client to want the bureaucrat's services; thus, this might be more true of a storekeeper than a nurse, and more true of a nurse than a bus driver.
Consider the case of the bus driver. Introductory texts in sociology like to cite the driver-passenger relationship as an example of a purely instrumental, secondary relationship. Neither party matters to the other as an individual. One would not expect the bus driver to modify his behavior vis-a-vis new immigrants or anybody else, yet our preliminary observations seem to indicate that he does. Like other bureaucrats who come into contact with new immigrants, the bus driver tends to assume a teaching role, too. Besides trying to teach the idea of queuing, bus drivers were observed trying to persuade immigrant passengers that the cost of a ride on one bus was the same as the cost on the bus that had just gone by, or that the driver did not personally profit from each fare he collected, or that the decision for the bus to leave the terminal was not his. The consequences of the formal organization of a bus company that are understood by client and bureaucrat in modern society are simply not "obvious" to the non-Western immigrant.
Moreover, we have the impression-and the research now in progress will permit confirmation-that a kind of joking relationship grows up between drivers and new-immigrant passengers. This seems to be the case particularly where the passengers in the bus know one another-as in buses serving suburban settlements and city neighborhoods populated largely by new immigrants. Indeed, drivers on routes with concentrations of new immigrants have told us explicitly that they consider it desirable to get to know their passengers personally, because a new driver is likely to encounter "trouble" with non-Western immigrants, who may become unruly or begin to ask the usual questions anew: "How much is the fare?" "May I get off here?" and so on. In fact, we have had some indication that the bus companies recognize the desirability of less frequent changes of drivers on lines serving new immigrants. This "personalization" of the bureaucratic relationship represents a deviation from the impersonal, universalistic, specific relationship between driver and passenger which, in principle, ought to be unaffected by the substitution of one driver for another. It is an example of debureaucratization, which is the product of the dependence of the bureaucrat on the client's ability and motivation to perform his role as client.
It is important to note, however, that an official's dependence on the client to perform his role is probably of a different order from the kinds of dependence we discussed in the other examples reviewed in the first part of this paper. In the earlier examples, the client actually had power over the bureaucrat-he could affect his well-being both as a member of the bureaucratic organization and as an individual. Thus, the clients of the disbursing officer were his superiors in other relationships, or the men in combat or in the mine could withdraw their reciprocal protection of their superior. In the present instance, however, the passenger has power over the driver in very much the same sense that a baby has power to disrupt the family schedule, and clearly this creates dependence of quite a different order.29
Bureaucrats as Socializing Agents
The process of a bureaucrat stepping outside his role to teach a new immigrant how to act his role as client is highly reminiscent of the processes of socialization and social control as analyzed by Parsons.80 In the socialization of the child, or in the process of psychotherapy, the socializing agent steps out of his place in the larger social system and assumes a role in the "deviant" subsystem. Thus, the mother is a member of the inclusive family system consisting of father, mother, and children. To bring a new child into this more inclusive system, she must use her role in the earlier mother-child subsystem and selectively reward the child for obedience and disobedience to the new expectations of the inclusive system while at the same time providing a basis of support for the child in his effort to learn the new role. At times, however, the mother may fail as socializing agent, because she herself prefers 29Replying to the query whether the "dependency" of the child does not sometimes confer power equal to or superior to that of the person on whom dependency exists, Parsons distinguishes between power defined as "relative importance in carrying out the functional performance of the system" and as the "ability to cause trouble by threatening to disrupt the system." In this latter sense, "the child, and other persons or groups in dependent positions have considerable 'power.'" See Talcott Parsons and Robert F. Bales, Family, Socialization and Interaction Process (Glencoe, 1955), p. 46, n. 18. It is this second type of power which concerns us at this point. '0lbid., ch. ii.
to remain in the "deviant" subsystem and, ignoring the father and the rest of the family, acts to "keep the child for herself." The parallel seems striking to us. The assumption of a teaching role by the bureaucrat and the "personalizing" of the bureaucratclient relationship seems to function for the process of immigrant socialization as does the behavior of the socializing agent vis-a-vis the child. One of the objects of our empirical study will be to determine whether this kind of bureaucratic behavior (whatever its dysfunctions for the organizational routine) contributes more to the adaptation of the new immigrant than the unbending bureaucrat-client relationship.
Even more striking, perhaps, is the parallel to the kind of mother who "keeps the child for herself." Thus, a bureaucrat who has assumed a teaching role may fail to bring the new immigrant client to play the role expected of him by the bureaucracy and may, instead, remain a member of the "deviant" subsystem. This possibility is most conspicuous perhaps in the case of the village instructors who are assigned to each new settlement of immigrants. These instructors are part of a regional Settlement Authority which, in turn, is part of a nationwide Settlement Department. Sometimes, instead of mediating between the new immigrants and the authorities, the instructor becomes so much a part of his village community that his major effort is devoted to "representing" the interests of his clients vis-at-vis the authorities.
The village instructor typically lives among his clients and is potentially available all day long. His job, as compared with the bus driver's, is a highly diffuse one and includes teaching the settlers, who were semiskilled craftsmen or peddlers, to be farmers, co-operators (as this is understood in the moshav)31 and Israelis. In this case debureaucratization is manifested not merely in the establishment of informal relations, but rather in the surrendering of part of the bureaucrat's commitment to his bureaucracy in favor of acceptance of a role in the system which he is expected to change. Of course, this is only one of the ways that the instructorgiven his highly diffuse and flexible role-can shape his relations with his clients. Some instructors, obviously, take quite the opposite position. Their control of the resources necessary for the very existence of their clients permits them to move in the direction of overbureaucratization. They may interfere in matters'-religious observance, for example-which ought properly to be outside their (very broad) spheres of influence.
An even more complicating factor is that the instructor, apart from his bureaucratic role, is often eager to make his clients fullfledged members of the nationwide small-holders co-operative movement or even of his political party, and to have them identify with its ideology, participate in its activities, and so on. Among the instructors who play this double role-which is by no means always considered illegitimate by the upper echelon of the Settlement Authority-many tend to view the various aspects of their bureaucratic role of training immigrants in agriculture and administration as a means to the end of full citizenship. This goal, for the ideologically oriented Israeli, implies the assumption of political and ideological commitments. Such instructors aim at making their clients members of a solidary movement of which they themselves are a part. This subsidiary aim makes the instructor even more dependent on the settlers. They may easily threaten not to participate in the movement unless the instructor provides them with various benefits and allocations for which he is the intermediary, though these may not be their due. In response the instructor may either move in the direction of debureaucratization and succumb to these demands, or he may attempt to use his bureaucratic position to force the clients to assume the political and ideological roles he envisages for them.
Bureaucrats as Leaders
A bureaucrat serving as "representative" or as "organizer" of his clients is by no means the extreme example of the kind of debureaucratization which may result from the bureaucrat's assumption of the role of socializing agent. Sometimes bureaucrats become charismatic leaders of groups of their clients.
Consider, for example, the case of several nurses employed at a well-baby clinic in a relatively segregated immigrants' "transitional community" within one of the major cities. In this setting the nurse-like the village instructor-is expected to be a teacher and to establish the kind of relationship required for successful teaching. Thus, along with the curative and preventive medicine practiced in such clinics, she must teach the women how to care for themselves and for their children in the particular manner prescribed by the modern scientific and philosophical orientation of the well-baby clinic. The authority of the nurses observed, however, extended beyond these rather broadly defined functions. They became generalized counselors and the clinic soon took on the air of a kind of social center where women gathered to greet each other, to gossip, and to move within the orbit of the nurses.
Some of the nurses had become preoccupied with the position of women in non-Western families. Apparently, this particular problem had first attracted attention as a result of the frequently negative reactions of their clients' husbands to one or another of the practices recommended by the clinic. Having thus become sensitized to the subordinate role of their clients within their families, the nurses added the reconciliation of family conflict to their counseling efforts and, in fact, some of the nurses considered it part of their job to teach women their "rights" vis-at-vis their husbands. In several instances, we have even heard nurses recommending divorce to their clients! Step by step, then, these nurses seem to have moved out from their broad but relatively welldefined functions (which include teaching) to assume an even broader teaching and counseling role and, in some instances, to leadership of a kind of "suffragette" movement among their clients. In such cases, the leader does not appear averse to illustrating her message with reference to her own private life or that of her friends. And to the extent that they follow, the clients look to their leaders for active support and guidance, and to sharing in the consequences of their behavior.
The leadership role, as played by the bureaucrat, represents a considerable degree of debureaucratization. It represents, in part, exchange of the authority vested in the bureaucratic office for the "voluntary" loyalty of clients; that is, such leadership exists not 130 ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY only by virtue of an "appointment" but by virtue of being "chosen" by followers as well. To that extent, the bureaucrat must submit himself to the authority, and to some of the norms, of his followers. Moreover, he has considerably extended the sphere of his influence from the specific tasks assigned to him to the wider, more diffuse, tasks inherent in the leadership role.
DIRECTION OF FUTURE RESEARCH
The variety of official relations with new immigrants in Israel provides us with a unique opportunity to locate the conditions under which debureaucratization, overbureaucratization, or both these organizational changes take place. Thus, we would expect debureaucratization to occur more often in relatively isolated settlements of new immigrants than in immigrant communities within the larger cities. In the isolated settlement the bureaucrat is far more dependent on the voluntary co-operation of his clients, both for the performance of his task and for his social and emotional (i.e. nonbureaucratic) well-being. One would also expect a greater dilution of the bureaucratic role with the teaching role in situations where a community of immigrants is transplanted more or less at the same time, compared with situations where migration was stretched over a long period of time. Under the former conditions, the immigrant community will have had less opportunity to educate itself and to develop the leaders, intermediaries, and interpreters who permit the bureaucrat to play his role uninterruptedly. In both the isolated immigrant community and in the transplanted immigrant community, the "segregated" equilibrium between the organization and its environment is likely to be more upset, and hence more marked organizational change may be anticipated. In both these cases, one might argue that the direction of change might well be toward greater, rather than lesser, bureaucratization in the sense that the organization has a unique opportunity to impose itself on more aspects of its clients' lives than is usual. Our hypothesis holds otherwise, as we have tried to argue above, but the plausibility of the competing hypothesis illustrates how the two ostensibly opposite directions of organizational change stem from closely similar conditions. Our study will enable us to make other comparisons, too. Again, it is easier to choose the situations in which deviation from the ideal bureaucratic norm is more likely to occur than it is to predict the direction of the deviation. Thus, when the bureaucrat is confronted primarily by clients of his own group he is likely to move either in the direction of bureaucratic formalism, studiously seeking to demonstrate his rootedness in Israeli life and to resist the particularistic expectations of the relative newcomers to Israel, or he may move in the direction of debureaucratization in the sense of reaccepting portions of the pattern of traditional authority and behavior of which he was once a part. Compared to the bureaucrat dealing with members of his own ethnic group (who may, because of his better understanding of the group, be more successful in his task), the bureaucrat without an ethnic affiliation with his clients will display more affective neutrality, though this may still lead to overbureaucratization. Again, we expect to find that bureaucrats in close touch with their colleagues can maintain a more detached, objective, service-oriented attitude to their clients than bureaucrats dependent on their clients for social and emotional acceptance and interaction. And, for the same reason, we expect bureaucrats with more extended contacts with a given group of clients to depart from the norms of bureaucratic behavior to a greater extent than bureaucrats with relatively brief and less regular contact.
In this report of preliminary observations on the contact between Israeli organizations and the mass immigration from nonWestern countries into Israel in recent years, we have tried to formulate an approach to the study of organizational change, par-132 R ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY ticularly to change in the official-client relationship in response to this new kind of clientele. Contrary to the expectations of classical sociological thinking, we have considerable impressionistic evidence pointing to a process of decreasing bureaucratization, at least in the relations between immigrant-clients and those parts of the bureaucracy which come into contact with them. We have tried to explain this finding by reference to the constraints operating on the bureaucrat who comes into contact with the public to train the immigrant client to perform the client role in order that he (the bureaucrat) may perform his own role adequately.
It seems to us that this process implies a certain kind of dependence on the client as far as the bureaucrat is concerned. Specifically, the bureaucrat is dependent on the client's proper performance of the client role, although in a different sense than the client is dependent on the bureaucrat's performance of his. Beyond this, the kinds of situations we are exploring include those where the bureaucrat may look to his client for sociability, or may recognize him as a member of the same ethnic group, or may seek to enlist his client in other organizations of which he is a member. All these exemplify situations of heightened dependence and, presumably, greater deviations from bureaucratic norms.
We have tried to suggest that the various forms of dependence which we found to be related to the process of debureaucratization may be subsumed under the more general heading of the articulation of role relations in modern society. The bureaucrat-client relationship is presumed to be segmented in certain ways from other kinds of social relations. Variations in the degree to which a given role relationship is insulated from other role relationships affects the degree of its bureaucratization. Thus, the process of debureaucratization may be characterized as an impinging of nonbureaucratic roles, or of other bureaucratic roles, on the specific bureaucratic role in question, while overbureaucratization may be expressed either in terms of the artificial insulation of the bureaucratic relationship from all other roles (however relevant) or, in its more totalitarian form, in the impinging of the bureaucratic relationship on relations not relevant to the bureaucratic role.
We have tried to set down some theoretical guidelines for a discussion of the problems of organizational change, with specific reference to the official-client relationship in a situation where there has been a rapid influx of immigrants having little previous contact with formal organization. We have tried to show that, in Israel, the process of decreasing bureaucratization is not an uncommon response in this situation, although we wish to emphasize that both increasing and decreasing bureaucratization may find simultaneous expression in different parts of the organization and, sometimes, in the very same relationship between official and client. It remains for the pilot study now in the field and the projected full-scale study to substantiate the general approach and the specific hypotheses we have proposed.
